PREDICTORS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN FAMILY FIRMS
Carlo Salvato, Università Cattaneo–LIUC & Jönköping International Business School
This study investigates the main predictors of entrepreneurship in small and medium sized family firms. Based upon literature review and a pilot case study, hypotheses are developed, relating several individual and organizational antecedents of entrepreneurship to three different family firm types. Most of the hypotheses are confirmed by an analysis carried out on a large random sample of small and medium sized Swedish family firms. Further studies addressing the determinants of entrepreneurship in family firms and practitioners’ advice aimed at enhancing entrepreneurship in such companies would hence benefit from targeting their efforts on the specific family firm types they address.
Entrepreneurship is important for a company’s survival, profitability and growth (Zahra 1991, 1996). Over the past two decades, researchers attempted to explain the determinants of entrepreneurship in established firms. While different industries have received examination, researchers have not studied entrepreneurship in small and medium sized established family firms. Given that these firms are widely recognized as core in today’s leading national economies (Kirchhoff & Kirchhoff, 1987; Donckels & Frölich, 1991; Cromie et al., 1995), understanding the factors that determine these companies’ entrepreneurial activities is a worthwhile research issue. To be informative, this research should consider different types of family firms and their unique characteristics that might influence these firms’ entrepreneurial activities. These issues are the focus of the current study.
This paper addresses two research questions: (1) What factors seem to play a major role in determining entrepreneurial orientation in family firms?, and (2) Do such factors differ between separate family firm types? To answer these questions, we first define entrepreneurship. Next, we discuss different family-firm types, paying attention to their unique characteristics. This discussion culminates in the study’s hypotheses, which are tested using a large sample of Swedish family businesses. Finally, the practical and research implications of the study’s findings are presented.
This paper advances the existing literature on entrepreneurship and family firms in three ways. First, it explores the predictors of entrepreneurial behavior in family firms, a crucial issue for their survival, profitability and growth. Second, the study highlights the importance of distinguishing between different types of firms when investigating the determinants of family business behaviors in general and entrepreneurial acts in particular. Third, the main results of the analysis allow to readdress some crucial issues in family business management, which may have been overlooked or misinterpreted by the existing literature, due to the failure to distinguish among different family firm types.
Research into entrepreneurship has grown rapidly over the past two decades. One of the most important themes in this research is the recognition of entrepreneurship as an organizational level phenomenon. Miller (1983), for example, defines entrepreneurship as “a multidimensional concept encompassing the firm’s actions relating to product-market and technological innovation, risk taking, and proactiveness” (p. 771). This definition has become widely accepted in the field (see Zahra 1991, 1996), and is adopted in this study.
Surprisingly, researchers who often invoke Miller’s work do not head his advice to consider the types of firms they examine. These practices can only yield mixed results that do not add cumulatively to the growth of research into entrepreneurship. Therefore, in order remedy this situation, it is important to distinguish among different family firm types. Authoritative classifications of family firms identify three organizational types: founder-centered, sibling/consortium, and open family firms. These firms differ in the role the founder and/or owner families play in the life of the company. Each of the three firm types has important dynamics that can influence entrepreneurship. The following paragraphs describe each type.
Having defined three family firm types, the discussion now shifts to developing hypotheses about the correlates of entrepreneurship within each. To organize the discussion of the hypotheses, four variable sets are examined: individual CEO characteristics, family firm issues, ownership structures, and organizational characteristics.
Founder-centered family firms. (H1-1) Individual CEO characteristics. In this type of firms, characteristics directly traceable to the founder are expected to play a major role in determining the firm’s entrepreneurship. Thus, the CEO’s perception of the firm’s ability to develop promising entrepreneurial ideas [Opportunity spotting] and to lead the firm towards successfully implementing such ideas [CEO leadership] will be crucial in determining entrepreneurship (Corbetta, 1995; Gersick et al., 1997). Further, founder-centered family firms are usually younger and smaller than the other two family-firm types. Hence, they have a smaller resource-endowment. Consequently, the founder’s tendency towards defining strategies on the basis of perceived opportunity—vs. resource availability—is also expected to positively influence entrepreneurship [Opportunity-driven strategy].
(H1-2) Family-firm issues. Established founder-centered family firms are often based on innovative ideas that, after a few years, often lose momentum. The presence of active second or third-generation members in the firm’s management [Active subsequent generations] may revive and foster entrepreneurship (Corbetta, 1995; Gersick et al., 1997).
(H1-3) Ownership structure. Given the smaller resource-endowment characterizing founder-centered family firms, the availability of financial resources are likely to stimulate entrepreneurship. Yet, financial resources are likely to be scarce in families that have either recently founded or bought a firm. Thus, financial resources from external investors [Venture capital; Investment Companies], may be positively associated with entrepreneurship (Evans & Leighton, 1989).
(H1-4) Organizational characteristics. The hypothesized crucial relevance of CEO individual and family-related aspects implies that other organizational actors will not have a major effect on the firm’s entrepreneurship. Thus, the presence of a relatively high number of managers [Managerial body] and the degree to which employees are evaluated and compensated based on the value they add to the firm [Value-based compensation] will not correlate significantly with the level of entrepreneurship (Jones & Butler, 1992).
Sibling/Cousin Consortium Firms. (H2-1) Individual CEO characteristics. These companies are characterized by the presence of a strong influence of the CEO or top managers who are usually family members. Thus, individual characteristics such as CEO’s perception of the firm’s ability to develop promising entrepreneurial ideas [Opportunity spotting] and CEO’s propensity to develop strategies based on perceived opportunity [Opportunity-driven strategy] are expected to promote entrepreneurship. Yet, unlike founders, successors are not innovative by definition: they must have learnt or absorbed innovative capabilities somewhere. Usually, previous experiences within the family firm, or in other firms, have the potential to increase successors’ entrepreneurial capacity. Thus, previous experiences [Same-industry experience; Different industry experience] are expected to be positively correlated with entrepreneurship (Cooper et al., 1989; Carroll & Mosakowski, 1987).
(H2-2) Ownership structure. A sibling and cousin consortium, by definition, is characterized by an extensive family ownership control. Thus, given the necessarily limited financial resources one or few related families can have access to, financial resources from external investors such as venture capital and investment companies [Venture capital; Investment companies] will allow the firm to undertake and support entrepreneurial projects (Evans & Leighton, 1989). Yet, a sibling or cousin consortium is often characterized by that increased presence of external institutional stockholders. The presence of these stockholders may increase decision-making complexity, slowing the firm’s willingness to support entrepreneurship. Thus, we expect the presence of other non-family and non-institutional or professional investors [Other investors] to negatively influence entrepreneurship.
(H2-3) Organizational Characteristics. Unlike founder-centered family firms discussed earlier, a sibling or cousin consortium may need the help of the entire company to generate innovations that foster entrepreneurship throughout its operations. Sibling/Cousin firms’ entrepreneurial activities, therefore, would benefit from the presence of a relatively large number of managers and external members in the board of directors [Managerial body; External board members]. These individuals increase the level of professionalization within the firm (Danco & Jonovic, 1981; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jennings & Lumpkin, 1989; Ward, 1991). The degree to which employees are formally evaluated and compensated based on the value they add to the firm [Value-based compensation] (Jenkins & Seiler, 1990) also enhances entrepreneurship. Similarly, the level of delegation and informality [Delegation & informality] within the firm’s organizational structure promotes entrepreneurship (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996).
Open family firms. (H3-1) Individual CEO characteristics. Open family firms are characterized by the presence of strong external managers, who usually do not have a direct, personal interest in spurring entrepreneurship. These managers are more interested in growth as a means of increasing their personal gains (Fama & Jensen, 1983). This orientation towards growth may increase these managers’ incentives to support entrepreneurial activities. Thus, a CEO’s growth orientation [Growth orientation] is expected to positively associated with entrepreneurship. Yet, a favorable disposition towards growth will not suffice to generate innovation, however. Besides a growth orientation, the CEO has to believe that the firm has the ability to develop promising entrepreneurial ideas [Opportunity spotting]. Finally, professional managers characterizing open family firms will likely to want to control the resources they use in pursuit of bold, innovative actions. Thus, in open family firms, a focus on resource control [Resource control] will be positively associated with entrepreneurship.
(H3-2) Ownership structure. External managers’ incentive to support entrepreneurship may be increased by giving them a share in ownership (Zahra, 1996). Thus, the percentage of shares professional CEOs hold [CEO ownership], as well as the percentage of shares owned by non-family members of the board and management team [Board/management ownership] will be positively associated with entrepreneurship (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jenkins & Seiler, 1990; Jones & Butler, 1992; Zahra, 1996). Conversely, the presence of external owners [Inactive owners; Investment companies] may have a negative impact on entrepreneurship because of these investors’ interest in short term results (Shleifer & Vishny, 1990; Porter, 1992).
(H3-3) Organizational and governance characteristics. In these companies, there is a need to give employees an incentive to undertake the risks associated with entrepreneurship. In this context, the degree to which employees are evaluated and compensated based on the value they add to the firm [Value-based compensation] will be positively associated with entrepreneurship. The presence of both family and non-family managers and board members [Managerial body; Board members] will also be positively associated with entrepreneurship (Danco & Jonovic, 1981; Jennings & Lumpkin, 1989; Ward, 1991). The diversity of these directors’ backgrounds can improve innovation. Also, the presence of non-family members on the board can create an effective system of checks and balances, one that can promote entrepreneurship.
Hypotheses were tested using large, stratified random sample of Swedish companies. The total sample consisted of 2455 small and medium sized located throughout Sweden. The target respondent was the chief executive officer. The overall response rate was 52.1%. Excluding cases with missing data, the final sample had 1222 firms. Companies averaged 34 years (S.D.=37) in age and 55.7 (S.D.=51) full time employees.
To classify firms into the three types described above, firms at least five years of age were identified, yielding a sub-sample of 1090 firms. Then, we identified family firms within this sub-sample (n=535). A family firm was defined as having majority family ownership, or was perceived by the CEO as being a family firm. Next, we distinguished the three family firm types using a combination of variables: family ownership; access to CEO position (i.e., founder, inheritance, firm-acquisition, hiring); number of generations directly involved in the firm’s operations; managerial controls exercised by family members; and the CEO’s perception of the firm as a family business. This process resulted in 230 founder-centered family firms, 135 sibling/cousin consortium, and 155 open family firms. It should be noted that 15 companies were excluded because of missing data.
Measures. To test the hypotheses, we adopted established measures. In particular, entrepreneurship was measured using a nine-questions, Likert-type scale. Within this scale, three items gauged each of the three constructs innovation, risk-taking and proactiveness. The scale was developed and validated by Miller (1983).
Analysis. We tested the hypotheses using both simple correlation and regression analysis. Simple correlations were calculated for each of the three family types as well as the overall sample. Next, stepwise regression analysis was performed for each family type, to identify major entrepreneurship correlates.
Table 1 displays the correlations between entrepreneurship and several antecedent sets for each family-firm type separately as well as for the entire sample. Several variables are significantly correlated with entrepreneurship, supporting the theoretical relevance of these variables. For almost all the study’s variables, correlations that were significant for the whole-sample were significant for only one but no more than two family firm types, affirming the importance of the contingency approach used in this study.
Table 2 presents the results of stepwise regression analyses. Overall, most of the study’s predictions are supported. Further, Table 2 shows that the regression model is strongest in the case of Sibling/cousin consortium type of family firms, where about 47 percent of the variability in entrepreneurship is explained.
Founder-based family firms. (H1-1). Individual CEO characteristics. Results of correlation and regression analysis support the study’s predictions related to the CEO’s role. The founder’s perception of a firm’s ability to develop promising innovative ideas is also strongly linked to entrepreneurship. Indeed, this is the only relationship that applies to all three types of family firms, reinforcing the belief that opportunity spotting is one of the basic determinants of entrepreneurship. Yet, while in the other two types opportunity spotting tends to be coupled with organizational or governance elements, in founder-based family firms it co-operates with other CEO’s individual characteristics: leadership and industry experience, strategic orientation (the latter two emerging from correlation analysis on Table 1). In these firms, which are characterized by a smaller average size and resource endowment, strategic orientation is positively related to entrepreneurship when it is directed towards pursuing opportunities regardless of the amount of resources currently controlled, rather than building on existing resources. Previous experiences in other businesses seem to have a positive impact on entrepreneurial orientation while experiences in the same industry are not significantly correlated to entrepreneurship. Previous experiences in the same industry may have an impact on the decision to start a new firm, that is, on individual entrepreneurship. Yet, subsequent innovative acts within the established firm will be more likely suggested by examples and experiences drawn from diverse business environments. An extended experience within the same industry may even have negative effects on entrepreneurial intensity, maybe because of an increasing inability to look at the industry and market with fresh eyes. Finally, in founder-centered family firms, where a leadership imperative usually tends to prevail over shared and decentralized decision making, the founder’s previous leadership experiences may help the CEO put innovative ideas into practice. (H1-2) Family firm issues. The second hypothesis related to founder-based family firms is also strongly supported. As a matter of fact, the presence of active second generation members may reasonably increase the chance of spotting and pursuing entrepreneurial innovations. As suggested by regression results, in some cases the founder alone may find it difficult to have innovative ideas without the fresh momentum added to the firm by second generation members. (H1-3) Ownership issues. Hypotheses concerning ownership issues are partially supported. As predicted, the percentage of shares owned by professional investors is positively related to entrepreneurship. Unlike other potential shareholders, professional investors may be interested in enhancing innovation and entrepreneurship in young, closely-held family firms. Yet, such role seems to be played only by investment companies, not by venture capital. (H1-4) Organizational and governance issues. Founder-based family firms are often described as relying on the founder alone for bold innovative actions. The picture emerging from the analysis is complemented by what may be an overlooked determinant of entrepreneurship in closely held and managed family firms. Regression analysis shows that employees’ value-based compensation has the strongest significant correlation with entrepreneurship. Moreover, correlation analysis shows that delegation and informality in the organizational structure are also positively related with entrepreneurial orientation. Concerning governance, Table 1 shows positive, significant correlations between the presence of external board members, the number of decision-making board meetings held annually, and entrepreneurship. Hence, the founder of an already established family firm needs support from both family and non-family members of the organization to proactively devise innovative business ideas, and to take the risk of pursuing them. (H1-5) As expected, none of the two control variables was entered in the regression equation. This means the entrepreneurial level within founder-based family firms is mainly determined by managerial variables, instead of demographic, non-manageable ones. The same result holds true for both the other family firm types.
Sibling/cousin consortium. (H2-1) Individual CEO characteristics. Hypotheses concerning relevance of the perceived ability to spot promising entrepreneurial ideas, and the tendency to define strategies on the basis of perceived opportunity are strongly supported. Entrepreneurial orientation in these firms still heavily relies on top managers’ individual ingenuity and on their attitude towards basing innovative strategies more on perceived quality of spotted opportunities, than on actual quantity of available resources. Yet, hypotheses relating to previous CEO experiences are manifestly rejected. Not only CEO previous experiences in the same or other industries were not entered in the regression equation, but experiences in the present industry show a significant negative correlation with entrepreneurship. Previous leadership and management experiences, on the opposite, are positively and significantly correlated with entrepreneurial orientation. It may be concluded that successors’ training—if aimed at developing entrepreneurial capabilities—should focus more on developing broad leadership skills, than specific, business-related knowledge. The accent put by the literature on previous business experiences is maybe aimed more at developing managerial—i.e., efficiency-related—skills, than truly entrepreneurial ones. (H2-2) Ownership issues. Ownership-related hypotheses only partially hold. The share owned by professional investors does show a positive influence over entrepreneurship, but only in the case of venture capital. This is an unexpected result, especially if compared with that for founder-based family firms. Indeed, sibling/cousin consortium family firms are usually significantly older than founder-based ones. Hence, venture capital should play a much more central role in the latter, than in the former family-firm type. The answer may be that family firms in our sample are established ones. In the case of founder-based firms, venture capitalists have probably played an important role in the first five years of the company’s life, a period that is not covered by the analysis. On the contrary, tapping subsequent entrepreneurial opportunities by second- or third-generation family firms may have required the contribution of venture capital. (H2-3) Organizational and governance characteristics. These hypotheses are only partially supported. Having a large managerial body and an informal organizational structure proves to be positively related, as expected, with the firm’s entrepreneurial level. Hence, sibling/cousin consortium type of firms can be characterized as firms on the path towards managerialization, yet still characterized by considerable levels of informality. Such an ‘organizational hybrid’ proves beneficial for the level of entrepreneurship. On the other hand, and contrary to the expectations, the presence of external board members and the attitude towards valuing and compensating employees on the ground of the value they add to the firm, do not show any significant relation with entrepreneurship.
Open family firms. (H3-1) Individual CEO characteristics. Given the nature of open family firms, purely individual characteristics are likely to be unrelated with entrepreneurship, as correlation and regression results clearly show. Yet, as hypothesized, idea-generating attitudes and growth orientation play a positive, significant role in enhancing entrepreneurship. The first aspect, opportunity spotting, has been already discussed at length. Rather, managers’ growth orientation appears as the major driving force of entrepreneurial processes in open family firms. The presence of external owners and managers may result in a lower impact of family-related objectives such as long-term company survival and securing a managerial position to family members. In open family firms professional managers’ growth orientation remains as a powerful driver of corporate entrepreneurship. (H3-2) Ownership structure. Contrary to the expectations, ownership plays no significant role in affecting corporate entrepreneurship in open family firms. These results may be explained by the relatively higher level of managerialization characterizing open family firms. Indeed, the relatively marked separation between ownership and management may reduce the impact owners can play on strategic choices, in favor of a markedly more intense influence of management. (H3-3) Organizational and governance characteristics. Hypotheses related to organizational characteristics are supported: both managerial body size and the tendency towards compensating employees according to the value they add to the firm are positively related with entrepreneurship, as expected in larger, professionalized firms. On the contrary, the board of directors seems to play no significant role in fostering entrepreneurship.
Two main conclusions emerge from the analysis. First, entrepreneurship in small and medium sized family firms is intrinsically related to individual CEO characteristics, to aspects of the relationship between family and firm, to governance and organizational characteristics, to the ownership structure. Second, these relationships vary from one type of family firm to another, in a logically predictable and statistically significant way.
Results clearly show that analyzing entrepreneurship antecedents at the aggregated-sample level would prevent from a deeper understanding of the peculiarities entrepreneurship takes in each family-firm type. Concealing these often dramatic differences is of course negative from a scientific standpoint, but it may also be detrimental to family firms, if aggregate results were used to suggest actions aimed at enhancing entrepreneurship in specific family-firm types. The role of CEO’s previous leadership experiences and experiences in other industries, for example, is strongly associated with entrepreneurship for founder-based family firms and at the aggregated sample level, but not for open and sibling/cousin consortium types of firms. The same difference between founder-based family firms and the other two types holds true for the number of external board members and board’s activity. On the contrary, the share owned by venture capital is significantly associated with entrepreneurship at the sibling/cousin consortium level, but not in the case of founder-based and open family firms. The only relationships significant both at the aggregated-sample level, and in each typology are those concerning opportunity spotting and opportunity-driven strategies. Hence, it seems that whatever kind of family firm is considered, having several promising entrepreneurial ideas and defining strategies more on the basis of such ideas than on the stock of currently available resources will enhance entrepreneurship.
The basic result with practical importance is that fostering entrepreneurship in family firms requires the use of different levers depending on the type of family firm we are dealing with. In founder-based family firms, for example, attention should be focused on the founder’s previous experiences and on his or her family, allowing second-generation family members to take an active role in entrepreneurial processes, though decision-making power will still rest upon the leader. Founder-based family firms, and their consultants, may also think of developing a more external and active board of directors, involving investment companies in ownership, and, above all, fostering employees’ contribution through value-based compensation. To enhance a sibling/cousin consortium’s entrepreneurial potential, focus may be first on training successors’ leadership experiences in unrelated activities, given the possible negative role on entrepreneurial capacity of previous experiences in the same industry. From an organizational standpoint, these firms’ entrepreneurial level may be enhanced by a relatively larger number of managers, while in terms of ownership, they should increase venture capital participation, and discourage ownership by inactive individuals. Finally, in open family firms the focus may have to be on the managerial body, that should be large enough to let several promising innovative ideas emerge, and growth-oriented enough to pursue them with resolution, despite the relatively higher level of separation between ownership and management usually characterizing these firms. From this last standpoint, increasing managers’ ownership share, as agency theory would suggest, does not seem to be a solution for promoting entrepreneurship.
CONTACT: Carlo Salvato, Università Cattaneo—LIUC, Corso Matteotti 22, 21053 Castellanza (VA), Italy; (T) (+39) 0331 572201; (F) (+39) 0331 572260; csalvato@liuc.it
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