The High Price of Dollar Stores: Dollar Tree and Dollar General Battle for Family Dollar1
By Jim Piller and John S. Strong
In the mid-2000s, the dollar store business segment of deep-discount retailers began to rise to prominence and expand rapidly. Despite the recession, the combined number of stores of the top three competitors in this segment, Dollar General (DG), Family Dollar (FDO), and Dollar Tree (DLTR), had risen from 16,700 stores in 2005 to 23,414 stores at the end of fiscal year (FY) 2013. That represented more stores than Target, Walmart, and Kmart combined. Rapid store growth placed these three dollar store competitors in very close proximity to one another. Price wars raged, profit margins fell, and rivalries heated up.
In this environment, Family Dollar began to stretch itself too thin and underperform its competitors. External competitive forces and pressure from investors—especially from private equity and hedge funds—eventually pushed the Family Dollar board of directors to consider selling the company to a competitor. In 2014, Dollar Tree and Dollar General both made offers to buy Family Dollar. While the Dollar General bid was higher, the Dollar Tree bid was believed much less likely to face antitrust challenges from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). It was up to the management and board of Family Dollar to decide which offer was better, and then convince their investors of this position.2
Dollar stores, also known as “small box” retailers and “deep-discount retailers,” have been around since the middle of the 20th century. The concept was originally designed as a resurrection of the general stores of old: a smaller store that had a comprehensive inventory designed to satisfy the day-to-day needs of the average customer. The key differentiator was price, which continued to be the most important competitive factor of the segment. Most items cost less than $10, and there was an emphasis on $1 products. An average Dollar General had 10,000 products or SKUs (stock keeping units). All prices were comparable to (or lower) than those of Walmart, generally considered to have the lowest prices of anyone.
Another important distinction of the segment was the small size and convenient locations of stores. Small-box retailer locations averaged 7,000 square feet per store, which was much smaller than a grocery store but bigger than a convenience store. As such, dollar stores could readily be located in a variety of shopping formats, including town/city centers, shopping centers, and strip centers.3
Traditionally, small-box retailers sold an assortment of everyday household products, which largely fit into the “consumables” category. Examples included household chemicals (cleaners), paper products, health and beauty products, etc. In addition, they stocked larger items such as bed sheets and home décor, apparel, and entertainment products such as toys. Brand-name toys became a larger part of most dollar stores’ product offering, in an effort to broaden their customer base.4
Food products began to take up a larger portion of dollar stores’ consumable section. These were strategic products that the chains could purchase and sell at prices competitive with those of grocery stores, in an effort to draw more customers from those types of channels. Even more recently, some dollar chains began selling tobacco products. While boosting revenue numbers, they had small markups and hurt the companies’ gross margins.
Dollar stores historically catered to customers with lower incomes. More than half of all customers were willing to self-identify as lower-middle class or poor, and the average customer family made less than $50,000 a year. This demographic was much more price-sensitive than wealthier groups of people.
In addition, middle- and upper-middle-class customers, made frugal by the recent economic downturn, were attracted to the convenience of the stores. The dollar stores had made significant efforts to clean up, to standardize layouts, and to improve the shopping environment. In the process, they had begun to remake their brand image.5 The middle-class customer became a significant segment of dollar store business, which further expanded perceived market opportunities.
The expansion of merchandise assortments and categories spurred a fast-growing type of retail behavior, the “fill in” trip. This represented a consumer making a quick errand to fill up on a few daily household items. A fill-in trip involved a trip that was short in time duration and relatively small in terms of total money spent.6 In the past this need would likely have made a customer travel to several locations to complete the errand. However, since dollar stores carried a wide range of products, a fill-in dollar store trip could be accomplished in one location.
The fast growth and success of the dollar store segment in the late 2000s brought these stores into competition with the large discount department stores and superstores. While dollar store revenues grew rapidly, Wal-Mart’s U.S. sales were stagnating. Some customers, tired of making the 30-minute drive to a Walmart on the edge of town, instead opted for the five-minute drive to the nearby dollar store, which stocked most of the products they needed on a more frequent basis.
Wal-Mart’s CEO, Doug McMillon, responded by opening Wal-Mart’s own line of small-format stores, dubbed “Walmart Neighborhood Markets.” These stores were smaller, located more centrally, and were designed to compete with supermarkets. However, Neighborhood Markets also became Wal-Mart’s strategy to counter dollar stores. By 2014, there were nearly 300 Neighborhood Market stores and plans to open approximately 200 per year going forward. Wal-Mart was presenting a significant competitive threat to the continued success of the dollar store model.
Summary financial and operating performance for Dollar General, Dollar Tree, and Family Dollar is presented in Table 1. Ten-year share price performance is shown in Figure 1.
Comparative Performance of Dollar Store Industry, 2014
(financial amounts in $ millions)
|Number of Stores
|Return on Sales
|Return on Assets
|Return on Equity
|Price: Earnings (trailing)
Share Performance of Dollar Stores, 2005–2015
Source: Yahoo! Finance, based on author inputs.
Dollar General had long been the largest of the dollar stores. The first Dollar General was opened in 1955 in Scottsville, Kentucky, by J.L. Turner and his son, Cal. Initially the business followed a model where every product cost $1. Cal Turner took over leadership of the company in the 1960s upon the death of his father. Cal’s son Cal Jr. took over the company in 1977 and remained CEO until 2003. When he stepped down, the company had more than 5,000 stores and yearly revenue of nearly $7 billion. By then, like Family Dollar, Dollar General had abandoned the dollar-per-item pricing strategy and opted to sell products at a variety of prices but all generally less than $10.
The mid-2000s were a difficult period for Dollar General. Overexpansion and poor use of store space led to slowing sales and declining net income. The company was taken private by the private equity firm KKR. New CEO Rick Dreiling led a quick and dramatic turnaround. Through store closures, optimized product mix, increased shelf productivity, and reduced costs, the chain improved both profitability and growth and once again became the segment leader.7 The company went public again in 2009, only two and a half years after its buyout by KKR. By 2014, Dollar General operated more than 11,500 stores, with revenues of $19 billion and more than $1 billion in profits. Dollar General was clearly the largest company of the dollar stores, with sustained financial performance and a strong balance sheet. While Family Dollar was struggling, Dollar General was continuing to grow, but with a new competitor in Dollar Tree.
Dollar Tree differed from its competitors by being a “true” dollar store in that every product it sold cost the customer $1. Dollar Tree was started in 1986 by Doug Perry, Macon Brock, and Ray Compton as a pilot project of five stores named “Only $1.00.” These stores proved successful and quickly expanded. Through the 1990s, the company, renamed Dollar Tree, grew organically and via acquisitions of other dollar store brands. The acquisitions allowed Dollar Tree to quickly grow its geographic footprint and consolidate a large part of the $1 price point segment under one company. Due to strict adherence to the $1 only policy, Dollar Tree’s product mix was somewhat different from that of Dollar General and Family Dollar. Dollar Tree sold products in two broad categories: consumables, and “variety categories” consisting of toys, durable housewares, and greeting cards.
By 2014, Dollar Tree had become a Fortune 500 company, with more than 5,000 locations, almost $9 billion in revenue, and better financial performance than either Dollar General or Family Dollar. Dollar Tree’s share performance corresponded to this mix of growth and profitability, as shown in Figure 1. During the past decade, while Dollar General and Family Dollar had approximately doubled in value and had outperformed the broad market, Dollar Tree’s stock price had risen 800 percent, with especially rapid rise from the beginning of 2013.
The company had become interested in moving away from the $1 only segment of small-box retail. Dollar Tree also owned a chain of stores that had a similar model to Dollar General’s and Family Dollar’s called “Deal$.” A discount variety store chain, Deal$ had been acquired by Dollar Tree from Supervalu in 2006. Deal$ had 194 stores in 19 states and was only a small part of Dollar Tree. Dollar Tree realized that growing Deal$ to compete with both Dollar General and Family Dollar would be a major challenge.
Family Dollar was founded in 1959 by Leon Levine with the first location opening in Charlotte, North Carolina. This store was stocked with a wide range of household products, with no prices exceeding $2 per item. The business model caught on and the company grew quickly. There were 50 stores open by 1970 when the company went public. By the end of the 1980s, there were 1,500 Family Dollar stores in the United States. The company continued to grow steadily through the 1990s and 2000s.
Family Dollar’s customer and market segment had been more urban and poorer than that of Dollar General. With the financial crisis and recession beginning in 2007, Family Dollar’s discount prices became much more attractive, and sometimes necessary for its cash-strapped consumers, who could no longer afford other stores. While already pursuing a strategy of aggressive store openings, the Family Dollar leadership announced its intention to triple its number of stores, including more stores in existing markets and expansion into middle- and upper-middle-class suburban markets. They believed these new store openings would be a huge source of new revenue, to complement revenue growth in existing stores in lower-income markets. Between 2010 and the end of 2013, the number of Family Dollar locations increased by nearly 1,500—the most openings in company history. Much of this expansion was financed through debt; Family Dollar’s debt had remained stable at $250 million until about 2011, when it doubled to more than $500 million.
This aggressive strategy quickly backfired. Revenue growth initially accelerated as planned, but not enough to cover the increased costs of Family Dollar’s larger geographic footprint. The new locations cannibalized sales from existing locations, causing a drop in comparable store sales growth, eventually reaching negative same-store sales in late 2013 and continuing into 2014.
During this time, Family Dollar also adopted a pricing strategy different from that of its competitors. It initiated extremely deep discounts into some of its most popular products, making them significantly cheaper than the competition’s, but increased the overall prices of all its other products by a small amount. The goal was to attract customers by the low prices of their staple items to the point where they wouldn’t notice, or wouldn’t care, that all the other products were a little more expensive. However, the price differences on nonpromotional products became much higher than those at Dollar General and at Walmart. As an indicator, Family Dollar’s gross profit margin was 33.2 percent in 2013, compared to Dollar General’s 30 percent. Moreover, Family Dollar had experienced four consecutive years of declining gross margins as the percentage of product sold at deep discounts grew. This high/low deep-discount policy had backfired on the company. The discounted items sold, but thinned gross margins, while other products that weren’t discounted remained on shelves.
As a result, Family Dollar’s total revenue growth was slower than that of its competitors, and average sales per store, sales per square foot, and profitability all lagged behind Dollar General and Dollar Tree. Companywide operating margins fell to just 4 percent compared to 9.5 percent for Dollar General and 12 percent for Dollar Tree. When the financial numbers for FY 2014 came out, it was obvious the company was in trouble: net income had declined by 35 percent. The stock price fell from the low $70s in mid-2013 to the mid-$50s by April 2014. The dollar store segment was fiercely competitive, and Family Dollar was rapidly falling behind.
Pressure to Sell the Company
Family Dollar’s woes were known to followers of the company’s financials for several years and had caught the attention of activist investors. In 2010, believing he could restructure the company and then sell it at a profit, Nelson Peltz attempted to take the company private with his investment firm, Trian Fund Management. His offer of $55–$60 per share was rejected and ultimately dropped in 2011. In the summer of 2014, another activist investor, Carl Icahn, announced that he had acquired a 9.4 percent stake in Family Dollar, and was intent on getting Howard Levine (the son of the company founder) to sell the company. Since Peltz’s 2010 offer, the company had performed worse, not better, and momentum to sell intensified. If Family Dollar, Dollar General, and Dollar Tree combined in any way, they could consolidate their geographic footprint. A combination of their supply chains and other infrastructure also would lead to savings of expenses in the hundreds of millions. Finally, consolidation would leave the purchaser of Family Dollar as the leader of the dollar store channel, in terms of raw store count.
By midsummer, a fifth of all Family Dollar stock was owned by multiple activist investors, all seeking to force Family Dollar to sell.
The Proposed Acquisition and Reactions
Dollar Tree was the first to make an offer for Family Dollar. In March 2014, Dollar Tree CEO Bob Sasser approached Family Dollar’s Howard Levine in private discussions about a merger. Sasser’s prospective value of $68–$70 per share was well above Family Dollar’s recent price of $55. But in an unanticipated series of events, Carl Icahn acquired a 9.4 percent stake in Family Dollar and announced that he would agitate for a sale of the company. News of Icahn’s involvement caused Family Dollar’s stock to jump 13.4 percent in one day, to $68 a share. This jump forced Dollar Tree to up its offer and go public. On June 20, 2014, Dollar Tree formally offered $74.50 per Family Dollar share, $8.5 billion total. This represented a 22 percent premium over Family Dollar’s stock price prior to the Icahn investment and was higher than the company share price had ever been. The proposal would give Family Dollar shareholders $59.60 in cash and the equivalent of $14.90 in Dollar Tree stock. Dollar Tree announced that it would borrow the full amount of the cash component of the purchase price, and that this debt financing had already been committed.
Dollar Tree had been trying to grow a retail business that sold products at more than just the $1 price point for some time, largely through its Deal$ chain. Purchasing Family Dollar would allow it to enter this market more effectively. However the most immediate financial benefits of the merger would be in the form of cost savings from company synergies. Dollar Tree estimated that the combined company would achieve savings of $300 million a year. It estimated savings would reach this level three years after the merger was completed. These savings would likely occur through a reduction in administrative operating costs, combined supply chains, and increased buying power of the new, larger company vs. its suppliers. Other than the estimated cost synergy savings, Dollar Tree did not intend to alter Family Dollar’s general business model or strategy. Howard Levine was expected to remain in charge of Family Dollar for the near future, receive a seat on the Dollar Tree board, and report directly to Dollar Tree CEO Bob Sasser.
This offer was an event of huge significance for the deep-discount retail industry. Dollar Tree CEO Bob Sasser summed up in a press release:
“This is a transformational opportunity,” stated Bob Sasser, Dollar Tree’s Chief Executive Officer. “With the acquisition of Family Dollar Stores, Dollar Tree will become a leading discount retailer in North America, with over 13,000 stores in 48 states and five Canadian Provinces, sales of over $18 billion, and more than 145,000 associates on our team.”8
The Family Dollar board immediately accepted this deal and following the announcement of the offer, the company’s stock price jumped to $74.25. Before the deal could close, it had to be put to a vote by the Family Dollar shareholders, who were scheduled to meet in December 2014.
Levine also voiced a positive opinion of the deal. His quotes on the deal were outwardly positive but had undertones of pragmatism; Family Dollar would have to become a subsidiary, but this was the best potential outcome for his troubled company, its shareholders, and himself:
“ ... we are pleased to conclude this process with the announcement of this compelling transaction with Dollar Tree, which our Board has unanimously determined to be in the best interests of our shareholders ... I look forward to working with the Dollar Tree team to complete the combination as quickly as possible to realize the compelling benefits for all our stakeholders.”9
Dollar General had long been interested in acquiring Family Dollar but had been slow to act. Overtaken by events, Dollar General quickly made a counter-offer. In August it offered $78.50 per share, and later upped its bid to $80, or a total of $9.1 billion for the company.
While they had a moderate presence inside of cities, Dollar General stores were generally located in the country and on the outskirts of towns. Family Dollar stores were more often located farther within urban areas. A merger with Family Dollar would allow Dollar General to have better access to customers in cities. It also would give Dollar General a larger footprint in the western United States. Similar to the benefit to Dollar Tree, Dollar General’s most tangible benefit from the merger would be from synergy-related cost savings. Dollar General’s management expected savings to reach $500 million within three years of the merger. Along with its merger bid, Dollar General announced its intention to be more hands-on with the management of Family Dollar, including replacing the Family Dollar executive team.
Although the Dollar General bid was 7.5 percent higher than the Dollar Tree offer, the Family Dollar board rejected it outright. The board believed that the bid carried substantial risk of being blocked by the FTC for antitrust reasons. A combined Family Dollar-Dollar General would operate 18,000 stores, much larger than a combined Family Dollar-Dollar Tree company. Even more importantly, since Dollar General and Family Dollar operated a similar business model, government review was likely to require substantial divestment of stores in overlapping markets—thus adding to the costs of any deal and potentially creating or strengthening competition and further decreasing the value of the deal.
In contrast, Dollar Tree’s offer was virtually guaranteed to pass government review, with only minor divestitures required. If Family Dollar spurned Dollar Tree’s offer and then was blocked from merging with Dollar General, it would be a disaster. It would have lost the opportunity to sell the company in sellers’ market conditions. Millions would be lost in opportunity costs and millions in legal fees. The stock price would plummet, and Family Dollar would be on its own, still facing its growth and margin problems, but now with increased financial burden, a low stock price, and angry shareholders.
Dollar General was emphatic that the risk of its offer was grossly exaggerated. It responded that Family Dollar’s logic was an oversimplification of the competitive landscape. It cited Walmart as its prime competitor, and the chief influencer of its pricing decisions.10 Dollar stores were still in direct competition with big-box retailers, grocery stores, convenience stores, drug stores, and e-commerce. Even the combination of the two leading dollar stores would still make up a relatively small part of the entire retail landscape, in Dollar General’s opinion.
Dollar General refused to take no for an answer. It added a $500 million “break-up fee” to be paid to Family Dollar to cover costs sunk into the Dollar Tree merger in progress, and offered to close up to 1,500 of its own stores to facilitate FTC approval of the deal. None of this changed the minds of Family Dollar’s board.
Dollar General responded by threatening to make the bid hostile. According to a strongly worded press release:
“Dollar General has made every good faith effort to engage in constructive discussions with the Family Dollar Board of Directors,” said Rick Dreiling, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Dollar General. “At each turn, despite Dollar General’s superior proposals and to the detriment of the Family Dollar shareholders, the Family Dollar Board has refused to engage, leaving Dollar General with no choice but to launch a tender offer.”11
Dollar General would offer $80 per share to any Family Dollar shareholder who would sell his or her shares to it. This would circumnavigate the influence of Family Dollar’s board and senior executives. If Dollar General were able to buy enough shares, it could force the merger, especially since Family Dollar had dropped its anti-takeover provisions in 2013. But a new problem had arisen for Dollar General, when it was announced that CEO Rick Dreiling would retire in May 2015.
As 2014 ended, the dollar store wars had become headline business news. Family Dollar had to decide how to handle the situation. It could stick to the original deal and hope the shareholders would side with it. However, it also could pressure Dollar Tree to offer more for the company—a position advocated by some of the private equity investors who now had substantial holdings in Family Dollar. But trying to spur a bidding war would try Dollar Tree’s patience and run the risk of no deal at all.
In November 2014, the U.S. FTC had announced its intention to fully investigate the implications of the proposed mergers. In response, Dollar General now promised to close 1,500 locations in order to make the deal more palatable for the government. This number amounted to almost 10 percent of the total Family Dollar stores. But by early January 2015, further discussion with government authorities revealed that it was likely that Dollar General would be required to close as many as 4,000 of its locations (more than 25 percent of the combined company) in order to obtain antitrust approval. This would have major implications for Dollar General.
Family Dollar shareholders delayed a vote on Dollar Tree’s offer several times. In January 2015, Dollar Tree announced any further delay would nullify its offer. Dollar Tree CEO Bob Sasser made his position in the matter perfectly clear on January 12 in a brief letter. He dismissed Dollar General’s offer as a distraction and detrimental to Family Dollar’s performance. “Despite the highly contingent and untenable nature of its offer, Dollar General has already damaged the Family Dollar business ... ” He called those trying to instigate a bidding war “mostly arbitrageurs and hedge funds with new positions in your stock, who have been saying that they will not support our transaction unless we raise our price.” Finally, Sasser warned, “After multiple delays, we have reached the end of our patience.”12
Sasser’s position was the final word—his offer was now “take it or leave it.” In fact, the offer was now more attractive than when it was initially made, both because Family Dollar’s financial performance had flagged and Dollar Tree’s stock value had grown.
Time was running out for Family Dollar. If the Family Dollar management had any hope of instigating a bidding war between Dollar Tree and Dollar General, and any other potential third parties, it had to abandon this or risk losing Dollar Tree’s bid for the company. Family Dollar’s worsening performance made the company a less attractive acquisition target. After dismal FY 2014 numbers, the results for the first quarter of FY 2015 were released, and the company’s financial problems were worse. Gross margins were falling sharply, and comp store sales were again negative.
Family Dollar moved to vote on the merger at a shareholder meeting on January 22, 2015. On the day of the vote, 74 percent of shareholders voted in favor of the merger. Family Dollar would become part of Dollar Tree; the sale price was the original $8.5 billion proposed back in July 2014. Analysts covering the issue pondered whether or not the deal would have been larger if antitrust issues were not such a major factor in the decision.13
Howard Levine thanked stockholders for not betting the fate of his company on an additional $600 million: “We are pleased with the outcome of today’s vote, and I want to thank Family Dollar stockholders for their support throughout this process.”14 The deal did provide huge payouts to Family Dollar executives and the hedge funds that had spurred the deal—Levine personally received $700 million while Nelson Peltz’s Trian group made $400 million on the deal. Icahn’s one-year investment return was $200 million. Icahn commented, “Dollar General should have bid much earlier. Once I got in, Family Dollar was in play. The chance that Dollar General could get it cheap was gone.”15
Dollar General expressed its disappointment. CEO Rick Dreiling stated, “Today’s vote is a loss not only for Family Dollar shareholders, but also for consumers across the country ...”16 His disappointment would be compounded by the fact that Dollar General was no longer the largest dollar store firm—the mantle had officially passed to Dollar Tree, whose store count was now set to exceed 13,000.
The deal was on track to formally close in July 2015, but the consequences of the merger battle continued. The government notified Dollar Tree that it would have to close roughly 350 stores for the merger to meet regulatory approval. Dollar Tree stated that the stores to close would nearly all be Family Dollar locations. An agreement was struck to sell 330 stores to Sycamore Partners, a private equity group that planned to operate them as Dollar Express, a brand that been acquired by Dollar Tree in 2000. Dollar Tree also announced a more sharply focused strategy for its Family Dollar business. Substantial investments would be made to make the old Family Dollar stores cleaner, brighter, and more shopper-friendly. Prices were to be lowered, with further cost reductions by improving store productivity and by reducing central headquarters costs.
Simultaneously, Dollar General announced its intention to expand aggressively with plans to open more than 700 locations in FY 2015 alone.17 Wal-Mart also announced acceleration in its expansion plans for Neighborhood Markets.
- This case was written by Jim Piller, MBA 2015, and John S. Strong, CSX Professor of Finance, Raymond A. Mason School of Business, College of William & Mary, as a basis for class discussion. It is not intended to illustrate either effective or ineffective management. Copyright 2015, by the Raymond A. Mason School of Business Foundation Board.
- For an excellent review of the deal timeline and the people involved, see Shawn Tully, “How the Dollar Store War Was Won,” Fortune, May 1, 2015, available at http://fortune.com/how-dollar-store-war-was-won/
- Conroy, P., Muthuraman, K., Kinzler, D., Narula, A., & Nanda, R. (2012). Dollar Store Strategies for National Brands. Deloitte.
- Based on information from the FY 2014 annual reports of Family Dollar, Dollar Tree, and Dollar General.
- According to Deloitte, the average monthly spend of a dollar store customer is $29.
- Frederick, J. (2014, October 20). Dollar General: Great Things Come in a Small Box. Drug Store News, pp. 14–36.
- Dollar Tree Stores Inc. (2014, July 28). Dollar Tree, Inc. to Acquire Family Dollar Stores, Inc. to Create North America’s Leading Discount Retailer. Retrieved from dollartree.com: http://www.dollartreeinfo.com/investors/global/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=862199
- Dollar General. (2014, December 5). Dollar General Responds to Comments from Dollar Tree. Retrieved from dollargeneral.com: http://investor.shareholder.com/dollar/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=886361
- Dollar General. (2014, September 17). Dollar General Remains Committed to Acquisition of Family Dollar. Retrieved from dollargeneral.com: http://investor.shareholder.com/dollar/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=871438
- Sasser, B. (2015, January 9). Letter to Howard Levine from Bob Sasser. Retrieved from sec.gov: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/34408/000119312515007188/d850571dex991.htm
- Gara, A. (2015, January 22). Family Dollar Shareholders Back Dollar Tree Merger After Long Fight. Retrieved from Forbes.com: http://www.forbes.com/sites/antoinegara/2015/01/22/family-dollar-shareholders-back-dollar-tree-merger-after-long-fight/
- Family Dollar Stores Inc. (2015, January 22). Family Dollar Stockholders Approve Dollar Tree Merger. Retrieved from familydollar.com: http://investor.familydollar.com/investors-relations/news-releases/Press-Release-Details/2015/Family-Dollar-Stockholders-Approve-Dollar-Tree-Merger/default.aspx
- Shawn Tully, “How the Dollar Store War Was Won,” Fortune, May 1, 2015, available at http://fortune.com/how-dollar-store-war-was-won/
- Dollar General. (2015, January 22). Dollar General Announces Rick Dreiling Will Continue as Chairman and CEO. Retrieved from dollargeneral.com: http://investor.shareholder.com/dollar/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=892479
- Dollar General. (2015).
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